hMailServer Alert Test
Testing my own hMailServer failed-login detection: eleven failed logins from a Thunderbird client raise Wazuh rules 100321 and 100322, open a LabWatch incident, and get triaged step by step.
Writing.
Testing my own hMailServer failed-login detection: eleven failed logins from a Thunderbird client raise Wazuh rules 100321 and 100322, open a LabWatch incident, and get triaged step by step.
The first round of a homelab exercise: Claude Code injects a real fault and files a ticket, and I work it blind as a live incident. One workstation cannot reach an internal web app while every other host and port is fine. The cause is a single outbound firewall rule, found by listing rules on what I knew instead of a guessed name and pinned to its port and address by a shared InstanceId.
A walkthrough of my eleven-system SOC homelab, from physical hosts and Active Directory to Wazuh, Velociraptor, Splunk, Sliver, and LabWatch incident response.
AS-REP roasting and AES Kerberoasting captured from KALI, traced through DC01 events, detected in Wazuh, inspected in Wireshark, and tested with offline cracking. Includes the Wazuh rule-tree issue that silently discarded a valid 4769 match.
One remote-access tool on a machine is normal; every managed service provider has one. The useful question is whether a second one showed up and whether the first one put it there. Four Wazuh rules built and fired against a live workstation, a certificate check that catches a renamed cmd.exe pretending to be AnyDesk, and the vendor-list gap that made the rule miss a real campaign.
The service came up on the first try, then I deleted it and rebuilt it because I could not have said what half of it was doing. Two version-pinned traps: the config generator offering to write private keys onto a network share, and the server address silently resolving to localhost.
Unauthenticated zone transfer, dynamic-update record spoofing, and WPAD credential capture against a domain controller, then the Wazuh detection and hardening that shuts each one down. A real Active Directory hostname resists spoofing where a fabricated one captures cleanly.
Web enumeration into an insecure direct object reference, an upload filter defeated for a foothold, then privilege escalation through a binary calling a command on a writable path.
Server Message Block enumeration into an exposed credential, a Microsoft SQL Server foothold via xp_cmdshell, then privilege escalation from a saved administrator password.
A vulnerable share on a domain controller with signing disabled and overprivileged service accounts. Enumeration, relay, and credential capture, then the hardening pass that closes each path.
Building the target before attacking it. Share and file-system permissions, why the two layers disagree, and the misconfigurations that make a share worth attacking in the first place.
Standing up a mail server on the domain controller so phishing can be practised end to end against infrastructure I own. Mail exchange and address records, then delivery.
No entries under that topic yet.